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 Are African leaders misusing
Chinese development ﬁnance?
The price of country ownership
In a 2012 blog post, MIT’s Daron Acemoglu and Harvard’s
James Robinson call attention to a “fancy school” built in a
small village in Sierra Leone and ﬁnanced by Chinese
development aid. They ask a pointed question: “Why
would anyone want to build a wonderful school in the
middle of what Africans call ‘the bush’?” As Acemoglu and
Robinson explain, “Yoni is the home village of Sierra
Leone’s president, Ernest Bai Koroma.”
African leaders seem to value aid from China because of the
way in which Beijing puts the ‘country ownership’ principle
into practice and fosters respect for the autonomy of a recipient
government to manage their own development policies. As
President Museveni of Uganda explains, “[t]he Western ruling
groups are conceited, full of themselves, ignorant of our
conditions, and they make other people’s business their
business, while the Chinese just deal with you as one who
represents your country […] .” Similarly, one official from
South Sudan claims: “the U.S. and our other [Western] friends
regularly tell us with certainty what we need. The Chinese
appear more open to talking and to hearing what we want.”
In a new paper, “Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the
Geography of China’s Foreign Assistance,” we investigate
whether the “school in the bush” is a mere coincidence or
representative of a broader pattern. Specifically, we investigate
whether and to what extent foreign aid is disproportionately
allocated to the birth regions of African leaders and/or those
regions populated by the leaders’ ethnicity. We argue that
China’s procedures for allocating aid gives political leaders in
aid-receiving countries more discretion in siting development
projects compared to those from Western donors. Such ‘aid on
demand’ may enable the recipient government to site projects
according its personal or political ‘needs’ rather than according
to the needs of the recipient population. To test this claim, we
compare the subnational allocation of Chinese and World Bank
development finance.
To track the amount of Chinese aid given to a particular
administrative region within African countries, we geocoded
AidData’s Chinese Official Finance to Africa dataset. The
resulting dataset consists of 1,898 project locations geocoded at
the provincial level and 1,575 project locations geocoded at the
county level. The figure provided below shows the amount of
aid that comes with these projects. While China is very active
across the African continent, there is significant variation within
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across the African continent, there is significant variation within
as well as across countries — a difference that most previous
research does not track.
Figure: Value of Chinese aid projects per subnational unit in
Africa (total value in million 2009 US$, 2000-2011, first
subnational administrative level)
Our empirical results demonstrate that a disproportionate share
of Chinese official financing goes to the birth regions of African
leaders. This is true even after we control for a large number of
other factors that might affect the location of a project.
Specifically, our results indicate that the average African
leader’s birth region receives nearly four times as much (270%
more) financial support from China during the period of time
when he or she is in power. We found no evidence of similar
preferential treatment in regions which were populated by large
numbers of the leader’s ethnic group.
Of course, these findings beg the question: Does aid from
‘traditional’ donors suffer from the same type of subnational
targeting bias? To address this question, we replicate the same
analysis with data from the World Bank, one of the largest
sources of development finance in Africa and the only other
‘traditional’, Western donor for which subnational data are
available for the entire African continent over the time period
our study covers (2000-2011). We did not expect World Bank
aid to be as vulnerable to politically-motivated targeting of
project locations because the Bank grants less discretion to
recipient governments and evaluates proposed projects using
rigorous analysis designed to minimize the risk of “failure.”
Empirically, we do not find a pattern of politically-driven
resource allocation for World Bank development projects.
World Bank projects are no more or less likely to end up in the
home province of the President than any other province in the
country.
Our statistical analysis suggests that Acemoglu and Robinson’s
“school in the bush” story is not a mere coincidence. Chinese
aid seems particularly vulnerable to political misuse because of
Beijing’s non-interference policy and the manner in which the
‘country ownership’ principle is implemented. Therefore, while
China’s ‘on demand’ approach to foreign assistance may be
motivated by good intentions, it increases the risk that external
resources will be allocated to politically important
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resources will be allocated to politically important
constituencies rather than communities with greater need.
Why should we care? Acemoglu and Robinson suggest that “the
fact that such fancy schools and houses are being built in the
president’s village, while most villages have no school and most
villagers live in a decrepit houses” could “be related to why
Sierra Leone is so poor.” Indeed, new research across and
 within countries suggests that when the allocation of aid is not
based upon need, it is less likely to improve development
outcomes.
One practical way to encourage need-based targeting is through
greater transparency. Development finance institutions can do
much more to publicly disclose where they are situating their
investments. Indeed, careful scrutiny of China’s on-demand
approach to international development finance will become
even more important in future years, as China scales up its own
bilateral aid program and assumes a leadership position in new
development finance institutions, including the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS’ New
Development Bank.
 
